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BUPFALO LAW REVIEW'
The more persuasive view, however, held by the Court of Appeals in
Prosser case, is that the burden of providing a speedy trial is upon the state,
on the defendant. 41 The state initiates the action and the state must see that
defendant is arraigned. It is likewise incumbent upon the state to see that
defendant has a speedy trial.
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The legislature expressly excepted from Section 668 of the New York Code
of Criminal Procedure a defendant who has neither applied nor agreed to a postponement. If it had been the intent of the legislature to deem the right to a
speedy trial likewise waived by inaction under the statute, it would have so
specified in the statute.
A defendant may, however, consent to delay in bringing the indictment to
trial and, by this consent, thus waive his right to a speedy trial.42 This agreement
need not be by express terms or by stipulation but can be implied if, for instance,
the case has been placed on the calendar and the defendant interposes no
objection to the District Attorney's motion for postponement.
"The actual result of the present decision, therefore, is merely to
impose upon the officers, charged with enforcing the law and who secured
the indictment, the 43quite reasonable, far from burdensome, duty of
noticing it for trial.

Evidence
From normal experience we know that refusal to answer a question or
accusation is often as much an affirmation of guilt as a positive answer. Thus in
New York, a defendant's silence is competent evidence for the jury's consideration.4 4 The prosecution is limited to this extent: the defendant must fully
comprehend the question or accusation; 4 he must have full liberty to answer;4"
and the circumstances must justify an inference of assent or acquiescenceja7
However, evidence of this kind of conduct after a defendant is arrested is not
admissible and evidence of this nature will be excluded.4 8 This latter rule was the
41. State v. Carillo, 41 Ariz. 170, 172, 16 P. 2d 965 (1932); State v. Chadwick,
150 Or. 645, 650, 47 P. 2d 232 (1935); Flanary v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 204,
35 S. E. 2d 135 (1945).
42. People v. Perry, 196 Misc. 922. 96 N. Y. S. 2d 517 (County Court 1949).
43. People v. Prosser,309 N. Y. 353, 361, 130 N. E. 2d 891, 896 (1955).
44. People v. Allen, 300 N. Y. 222, 90 N. E. 2d 48 (1949).
45. People v. Koerner, 154 N. Y. 355, 374, 48 N. E. 730, 736 (1897).
46. People v. Allen, 300 N. Y. 222, 90 N. E. 2d 48 (1949).
47. See note 46 supra.
48. People v. Rutqliano, 261 N. Y. 103, 107, 184 N. E. 689, 690 (1933)
(dictum); People v. Abel, 298 N. Y. 333, 335, 83 N. E. 2d 542, 543 (1949).
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basis for the Court's reversing convictions in People v. Travato49 and People V.
Namer. o

In People v. Travato, appellant, his hands and clothes oily and greasy, was
discovered in an automobile with one Fanning and fifteen sewing machines.
Fanning pleaded guilty, but exonerated appellant by stating that he met defendant
after the burglary. Defendant was convicted of burglary and larceny 5 ' mainly
upon circumstantial evidence. At the trial it became important to know where
defendant got the oil and grease. Police officers were permitted to testify that
defendant repeatedly refused to answer questions regarding his oily and greasy
hands and clothes. Defense counsel moved to strike this evidence but the Court
denied the motion and in its charge referred to the defendant's refusal to answer.

Upon appeal the Appellate Division affrmed without opinion. 52 The Court
in reversing the conviction and ordering a new trial, held that a defendant under
arrest has a right to remain silent and has no duty to answer questions. His
silence, therefore, was not to be considered by the jury as an admission that greasy
hands and clothes were the result of taking the sewing machines. The Court felt
this error was aggravated by the trial judge's referring to the defendant's silence
in his charge.

In People v. Namer, the appellant had been convicted of possessing a pistol
without a license which is proscribed by the PENAL LAW. 53 The Court reversed

the judgment and ordered a new trial because of two errors in admitting evidence
at the trial. The Court decided it was error to allow testimony that defendant
remained silent when interrogated at the police station about his having been

49. 309 N. Y. 382, 131 N. E. 2d 557 (1955).
50. 309 N. Y. 458, 131 N. E. 2d 734 (1956).
51. i.e., first degree burglary and third degree grand larceny. Defendant was
also convicted of possessing burglar's tools, a crime under the N. Y. PENAL LAw
§408. The Court reversed this conviction and dismissed that charge on the ground
that testimony of the presence of screwdrivers and gloves in Fanning's automobile
was insufficient to sustain the conviction. People v. Spillmnan, 309 N. Y. 295, 130
N. E. 2d 625 (1955).
52. People v. Travato, 286 App. Div. 853, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 640 (2d Dep't 1955).
53.

N. Y. PENAL LAw §1897(4).
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involved in other crimes in the area where he lived.54 The Appellate Division in
a 3-2 decision had affirmed,5 5 the majority holding that the errors did not affect
the result in view of uncontradicted evidence, (defendant had admitted he must
have had the pistol in his possession).
This writer submits that the decision in each case is sound. Although the
defendant in People v. Namer admitted possession of the pistol, a new trial was
properly granted because it is difficult to tell what effect the incompetent evidence
had on the jury.

Wiretapping
In People v. Ableson,50 the court in a per curiam decision reversed the
Appellate Division 57 and ordered a new trial for nine appellants who had been
convicted of inter alia, the crime of bookmaking 58 in a trial in which the People's
case rested mainly on wire-tap evidence. 59 The Court felt that the People had
failed both in their proof of the identity of the suspects and the commission of
the crime.
Since the wire-tapping was done pursuant to court order, not its legality but
rather its evidentiary value was questioned here. At the trial, the People's case
rested on the testimony of a special investigator for the District Attorney, who
54. The Court also found that the trial court erred when it permitted respondent to introduce evidence that defendant had violated his parole under previous sentences. The respondent argued for its admission because it showed that the
defendant had a motive to possess the pistol. Evidence of motive is competent
provided it will establish the motive for the particular crime charged, People v.
Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 293, 61 N. E. 286, 295 (1901), and has a logical relationship to the motive for the commission of the specific crime, People v. Fitzgerald,
156 N. Y. 253, 50 N. E. 846 (1898). Evidence of motive, however, is not competent
to show general criminal propensities in the defendant. People v. Zaehowitz, 254
N. Y. 192, 197, 172 N. E. 466, 468 (1930). The Cort applied these principles and
reasoned as follows: we doubt whether motive is relevant where possession alone
is criminal; assuming its relevance, the proof of motive offered here does not
meet the "logical relationship" test; therefore, respondent's object was a forbidden
one-to show defendant's criminal tendencies. In a concurring opinion, Judge
Desmond voted to reverse on the ground that motive is irrelevant where the
statute makes possession itself a crime.
55. People v. Namer, 286 App. Div. 890, 142 N. Y. S. 2d 351 (2d Dep't 1955).
56. 309 N. Y. 643, 132 N. E. 2d 884 (1956).
57. 286 App. Div. 946, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 165 (4th Dep't 1955).
58. N. Y. PENAL LAW §986. Any person who engages in pool-selling or bookmaking with or without writing at any time or place; . . . and any person who
records or registers, bets or wagers or sells pools or makes book, with or without
writing, upon the result of any trial or contest of skill, speed or power of endurance of man or beast ... or any person who aids, assists or abets in any manner
in any of the said acts, which are hereby forbidden, is guilty of a misdemeanor
59. N. Y. CoNsT. art. I §12; N. Y. CPI.

CODE

§813 (a).

